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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is> tar. ^ to 
i i i^eltndant vicke> A. s 
i"Rn\wprV) in the principal amount of $10,13? 23 plus costs, but denying Knighton 
specific oerformano T|-i- Court has jurisdiction over mis appu^ In 
Section :3-^a~ . . • " id to 
UI I. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
""h.-tria! court err<\.
 ::. . j , ,.., < iln i>t'il I >> ' " ' 
'ompn* - nfirfnrmn ice is a discretional, .v.....^ , 
- -r* — uei cm abuse oi diww.^jji; sunn , rris v. Sykes, 62* " °"1 
ott1, 684 (Utah 198 I); LHIW. Inc. v. Delorean. ?bJ- - •, „••.• 
II. I ne liui cuuiioriL'U ! " " i | "> H >' nii|ni m iivm ii.imk flie 
' cnids is a discretionary ruling that is reviewed 
w.th deference k, •>'•**• 1»:J«M . . I'.d judgment of the trial court. Jacobson v. 
Jacobson. 557 P.2-
III. Tr court erred in holding that Bowers had failed to clear title of the 
Property at the time of trial. M I L l iul court s findings of fact --e reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard ^r* trial coun
 a ; . , ; J , . . ^ . ;,;.. 
if they are so lac! ••--• .- :^\ of the evidence. 
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Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 
973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IV. The trial court erred in failing to award Knighton lost-rent damages. 
The trial court's decision to not award damages will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion. Lysenkov.Sawaya. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 31, fl 6, 973 P.2d 445. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain to 
this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 20,2000, Knighton filed a Complaint against Bowers alleging 
breach of a real property purchase agreement (the "Agreement") between Knighton 
and Bowers regarding certain real property, seeking specific performance of the 
Agreement, including conveyance of good and clear title to the real property to 
Knighton, or in the alternative, judgment for damages against Bowers caused by 
Bowers' breach of the Agreement. On December 15,2000, Bowers filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim against Knighton alleging Knighton's breach of the Agreement, 
and illegal placement of a Notice of Interest on the subject real property. 
On February 20, 2001, Knighton filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Bowers. On March 1, 2001, Bowers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Knighton. On April 30, 2001, the trial court denied both Motions for 
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Summary Judgment, holding that the Agreement was ambiguw. - e 
admission of extrinsic evidence Bowers in 
< Mi December 4, 2002, the trial court held a bench 
trial. At the end of the bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of 
Knighton and against Bowers, awarding Knighton damages 
specific performance ; nrt further held that Defendant 
< In I mil I in11 rlo.ir title to the subject real property as of the date of trial. On 
January 21, 2003, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusion:: 
Law and Judgment in favor ol l-'Luiilill m II n imiii iii.il mi hi ill $ III I'!!-' ??> plus 
>; ; ihton filed a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties entered into an agreement on December 
"Agreement"), whereby Defendant/Appellee Vickey A. Bowers ("Bowers") agreed 
to sell and Plaintiff/Appellant Kerry L. Knighton ("Knighton") agreed to purchase real 
property in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more particularly described as . 
the Kopperview Mobile Home I'jih Jjuhiln'M | ci1, 'fsul'i^rM 
ciihililniii. mi IIMI |,ilighton's due diligence. (R. , ., .. .„ . i, Trial Ex. No. 2.) 
Knighton learned of Bowers' desire to sell the Property because Bowers had 
advertised the Property for sale in The Salt Lai\ti mm..-,-
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When Bowers and Knighton entered into the Agreement, the Property was 
unimproved and not ready for a mobile home to be used on the Property. (T. 62-
63.) 
The terms of the Agreement included a purchase price for the Property of 
$15,000, with a down payment and deferred payments payable from Knighton to 
Bowers. (R. 77; T. 11,15; Trial Ex. No. 2.) The parties agreed that Knighton would 
pay Bowers $200.00 per month which would be applied to the purchase price of the 
Property and would be forfeited only if Knighton subsequently decided not to buy 
the Property. (R. 77; T. 15,46; Trial Ex. No. 2.) In signing the Agreement, Bowers 
represented that she had clear title to the Property. (R. 77; T. 11-12; Trial Ex. No. 
2.) Bowers did not, in fact, have clear title to the Property, but she should have 
known that she did not have clear title before entering into the Agreement based 
upon the deed that she had received regarding the Property. (R. 77; T. 12,173-74; 
Trial Ex. No. 2.) 
The parties entered into a subsequent agreement on April 19, 1996 (the 
"Extension Agreement"), which was entered into after Knighton discovered 
problems with Bowers' title and after he informed Bowers of those problems, 
specifically the existence of two trust deeds and one Certificate of Non-Compliance. 
(R. 79; T. 16-17; Trial Ex. Nos. 4-7.) These were the only title problems raised by 
Knighton. (T. 16-17.) The Extension Agreement was executed as an extension of 
the Agreement, adding that closing would be within thirty (30) days of Bowers 
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clearing title, in anticipation that the liens would be remuvuil will in i .1 i.lmrl linn1 (K. 
/y; I m, Trial Ex No 1 1 i i i r . i «ii.'ii!,nm /U IHVI IHI I I ,IIM> <• >,prosslv permitted 
1 i ' i i in inovp I111 ni"hil" home to the Property. (R. 79; T. 21,114-15; Trial Ex. 
Knighton originally intended to live >• 
changed r . 80-81 April of 
1996, Knighton moved a mobile home he owned onto the Property. (T 73, 118-
19.) Knighton sold the mobile home to a third party to whom he was intending to 
lease the Property, and maae imp > su m il i iimbili 
i imili in |iL)i cii mi ihi Pmpt-Ttv «ind be occupied in compliance with regulatory 
statutes. (T. 90, 92.) During 1996, Knighton improved the Property by obtaining 
a survey, obtaining a building permit, arranging 
vehicles l»v in&ldlliiiu .1 u)m n'lc IMI I mslalhiKi sow(M U ilur and electrical hookups 
mi a mobile home, installing steps for a mobile home, and installing fenceposts. 
(1. 74-79, 1< 108.) In April 1996, Knighton rented the Property to 
party for $200 a mo January i il 
1997, the third party moved the mobile home she had purchased from Knighton 
from the Property because of the delay in Knighton obtaining title to the Property. 
(T. 92.) 
"P"1 ii"ii«, mil i "rtificate of Non-Compliance were not timely removed by 
Bowers as anticipated in April 1996. (R. 25; T. 26-27.) By December 1996, 
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Knighton was concerned about the money he had been paying to Bowers with the 
risk of never getting the Property and unilaterally stopped paying Bowers directly, 
and instead paid the $200 monthly payment into an escrow account. (R. 25; T. 85-
86.) Bowers was notified of but did not object to this procedure. (T. 30-31.) The 
trial court held that it was reasonable for Knighton to protect himself from Bowers' 
breach by placing the money in escrow until such time as clear title could be 
provided. (T. 176.) 
Following December 1996, the Property was scheduled for a trustee's sale 
by the trust deed holder of the Property. (This was part of Knighton's previous 
concern regarding title.) (T. 29; Trial Ex. Nos. 15-18.) On February 11, 1998, 
Bowers paid $4,899.50 to save the Property from the trustee's sale and to obtain 
a release of the two trust deeds. (R. 60; T. 31; Trial Ex. No. 20.) After paying the 
money to obtain the release of the trust deeds, Bowers decided she had too much 
time and money invested into the Property to sell it to Knighton for the agreed sales 
price of $15,000.00. (R. 58-61; T. 32, 36-38.) In addition, Bowers paid off the lien 
in favor of Salt Lake County represented by the Certificate of Non-Compliance. (R. 
60; T. 34-35.) Notwithstanding repeated requests to close the purchase by 
Knighton, Bowers refused to close. (T. 40-42.) 
In November of 1999, after Bowers had notified Knighton that she no longer 
wished to sell the Property to him, she moved her own mobile home onto the 
Property. (R. 58; T. 41, 147.) Bowers had been paying $360 per month for lot 
E \Laune\Knighton\AppellateBrief wpd -6-
rental where her mobile home had previously been located (I 'II ) M in ih .vpd 
her mobile home to the Property beu-uisr she wi mill im IDIHH T Inve to pay the rent 
!n November 20, 2000, Knighton filed the Complaint 
against Bowers in this action seeking (i) specific performance of the Agreement as 
modified by the Extension Agreement; and (ii) in the alternative il,im<K|i-s l l1 I I t 
uecembe: Answer and Counterclaim against 
i i .II seeking removal of Knighton's Notice of Interest recorded on the Property 
plus damages. (R. 5-10.) r February 14, 2001, Knighton filed a Motion 
Summary Judgment. . > Motion W 
MINIMI iiy IIII|I||IIHIII 36-105.) On April 30, 2001, the trial court denied both 
Motions for Summary Judgment, ruling that genuine issues of fact regarding the 
ambiguities contained in the Agreement and the Extension Agret 
a trial to Ini.ii e/In nlniM i I M ' L intent of Knighton and Bowers in entering 
into the Agreement and Extension Agreement. (R. 173-78.) 
On December 4, 2002, the trial court held a bench trial in IIi i 
213-1 Januaiy ' i , ' inn, m ,i |r| ih,n the Agreement is 
legally binding between the parties; Bowers did not timely release the liens on the 
Property to obtain clear title; it was reasonable for Knighton to pay installment 
payments into an escrow account when bow 
alioriwv wnU ,i k'Hn In I' iiirjlilwii stating that Knighton had not performed under the 
Agreement, which was not true; Bowers did not advise Knighton of the release of 
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the defects in the title of the Property; Knighton was justified in not preparing closing 
papers as Bowers was not prepared to close; there is nothing unique about the 
Property; and entered judgment awarding Knighton damages but denying specific 
performance ofthe Agreement and lost-rent damages. (R. 222-27; T. 171-85.) The 
trial court further held that Bowers did not have clear title to the Property at the time 
of trial. (R. 222-27; T. 178,181.) On February 19, 2003, Knighton filed the Notice 
of Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Knighton specific performance of the 
Agreement. Because the Property is real property, it is unique and specific 
performance of the Agreement is the appropriate remedy for Bowers' breach. 
Evidence at trial was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of uniqueness of the 
Property. Bowers' decision that she had entered into a bad bargain, and therefore 
refused to close the sale ofthe Property, is not sufficient reason to deny Knighton 
specific performance as a remedy in this matter. Knighton fully performed under 
the Agreement and therefore does not have "unclean hands" as defined by Utah 
case law. The trial court erred in holding that Bowers did not have clear title to the 
Property at the time of trial because only three defects in the title of the Property 
were introduced into evidence at the time of trial and all three defects were cured 
by Bowers prior to trial. In addition to specific performance, Knighton is entitled to 
his lost-rent damages arising from Bowers' breach ofthe Agreement. Alternatively, 
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should this Court deny Knighton specific performance, judgment in favor of 
Knighton should be augmented by lost-rent damages to place Knighton in as good 
a position as if the Agreement had been performed by Bowers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING KNIGHTON SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. 
The trial court erred in its determination to award Knighton damages rather 
than the remedy of specific performance of the Agreement. The trial court ruled that 
specific performance is not preferred over monetary damages if monetary damages 
are sufficient, the Property is not unique, and that Knighton had unclean hands 
because rather than continue to make payments under the Agreement in December 
of 1996 he could have declared breach of the Agreement and demanded refund of 
prior payments to Bowers. (R. 222-27; T. 179-81; Addendum "A" attached hereto.) 
A trial court's denial of specific performance is a discretionary ruling that is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Morris v. Sykes. 624 P.2d 681, 
681 (Utah 1981). "Specific performance is an equitable remedy, and accordingly, 
the trial court is granted wide discretion in applying and formulating it." LHIW. Inc. 
v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961,963 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
as follows regarding the denial of specific performance and its standard of review 
on appeal: 
We decide as we do herein in awareness that, inasmuch as specific 
performance is an equitable remedy, the trial judge has considerable 
discretion in determining whether equity in good conscience required 
E:\Laurie\Knighton\AppellateBrief.wpcJ " * ^ " 
that relief be granted. But it is equally true that when the trial court has 
based his ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. 
where a correct one may have produced a different result, the party 
adversely affected thereby is entitled to have the error rectified in a 
proper adjudication under correct principles of law. 
Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently followed the general rule that the 
right to "an equitable remedy is an exceptional one and absent statutory mandate, 
equitable relief shall be granted only when a court determines that damages are 
inadequate and that equitable relief would result in more perfect and complete 
justice." Jenkins v. Percival. 962 P.2d 796, 804 (1998). 
A. Because the Property is Real Property, it is Unique and Specific 
Performance is the Appropriate Remedy. 
Because the Property is real property, it is therefore unique and the remedy 
that should be awarded to Knighton is specific performance. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that in the context of a buyer enforcing a purchase agreement for 
real property, the "rule has been long established that a vendee has a right to insist 
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able to perform." 
Castagno v. Church. 552 P.2d 1282,1284 (Utah 1976). 
Such a right to specific performance by a buyer of real property is due to the 
uniqueness of real property. Perron v. Hale. 108 Idaho 578, 701 P.2d 198, 202 
(1985). The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the general common law regarding 
the remedy of specific performance in the context of real estate purchase 
agreements as follows: 
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The general rules of the common law are that: (1) a party is entitled to 
the equitable remedy of specific performance when damages, the legal 
remedy, are inadequate; (2) because of the perceived uniqueness of 
land, it is presumed that damages are inadequate in an action for 
breach of a land sale contract, and the nonbreaching party need not 
make a separate showing of the inadequacy of the damages: (3) the 
remedy is equally available to both vendors and purchasers; and (4) 
additionally, the appropriateness of specific performance as relief in a 
particular case lies within the discretion of the trial court. 
i d (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld a purchaser's claim to the 
remedy of specific performance regarding real property purchase agreements, even 
if there are defects in the title of the subject real property. If there is a defect in the 
real property that the seller was aware of, but the buyer was not, the appropriate 
remedy is specific performance of the purchase agreement "with an abatement in 
the purchase price equal to the value of the deficiency or defect." Castagno at 
1284. Even if the defect in the real property is a defect in title, the appropriate 
remedy is still specific performance, because to hold contrary would allow a seller 
to breach a purchase agreement without consequence; "[n]ot only would a seller 
have no motivation to clear title, but the cost of clearing title would be shifted to a 
buyer determined to purchase the property." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp.. 
846 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court further held that 
"[sjpecific performance with an abatement in the purchase price has long been 
recognized as an appropriate remedy when a seller refuses to convey." ig\ 
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The trial court held that Knighton "is entitled to recover from the defendant's 
failure to get clear title." (T. 179.) The court then posed the question of what 
Knighton ought to recover. (T. 179.) The court stated the general rule that "if the 
court can grant an adequate remedy at law, it should not resort to equity." (T. 179-
80.) The court then reasoned that the Property is not "unique" to Knighton because 
it is a mobile home lot that is "not all that special." (T. 180.) The trial court also 
noted that the Property was the residence of Bowers at the time of trial. (T. 180.) 
The trial court's reasoning that the Property is not unique because it is a 
mobile home lot that is "not all that special" is not sufficient to rebut the presumption 
that each piece of real property is unique. Merely because a piece of real property 
is not of seemingly high value, or is a lot among other similar lots, its uniqueness 
as real property is not defeated. Such reasoning is insufficient to deny Knighton 
specific performance which is the appropriate remedy when a seller breaches a real 
property purchase agreement. 
This situation is akin to that of Dean v. Gregg. 34 Wash. App. 684, 663 P.2d 
502(1983). (See Addendum "B" attached hereto.) In Dean, the Washington Court 
of Appeals reversed a trial court's refusal to grant a purchaser specific performance 
of a real property purchase agreement. lg\ at 503. The seller refused to sell the 
subject real property because "costs started mounting up" after the agreement was 
signed. la\ at 502. The seller had to survey the subject property and due to the 
survey costs, the seller would not make as much money selling the subject property 
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as he had originally thought. ]a\ at 502. The court held that seller's decision to 
enter into a bad bargain does not defeat specific performance as a remedy for the 
buyer, id, at 503. The court reasoned that failing to sell a piece of real property 
because too much has been spent in preparing the property for sale "[i]n the 
absence of fraud (and none is charged in this case), that is not a sufficient reason 
to deny specific performance." id. In the case at hand, Bowers similarly testified 
that "I did not intend on selling it to [Knighton] for the original $15,000 once I started 
having to put money into it." (T. 32.) Bowers further testified "I put so much money 
into it paying taxes and - yes, I changed my mind. I didn't want to sell it for the 
price I quoted [Knighton]." As in Dean. Bowers' decision that the Agreement was 
a bad bargain is not sufficient to deny Knighton specific performance as a remedy 
in this matter. 
As a matter of public policy, the ruling of the trial court would question the 
enforceability of any real property purchase agreement regarding the purchase of 
a lot in a mobile home park or, for that matter, a lot in any subdivision where such 
lots are seemingly inexpensive or there are numerous other lots in the same 
subdivision of a similar nature. When Knighton entered into the Agreement with 
Bowers, he intended to live on the Property and make it his primary residence, 
which evidences the uniqueness of the Property to Knighton. (T. 80-81.) 
The fact that Bowers used the Property as a personal residence at the time 
of trial should not result in a denial of specific performance of the Agreement. At 
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the time Bowers entered into the Agreement, the Property was unimproved and not 
the residence of Bowers. (R. 58; T. 62-63.) In fact, Knighton intended to live on the 
Property when he entered into the Agreement. (T. 80-81.) After Bowers decided 
that she would not sell the Property to Knighton, she moved her mobile home onto 
the Property and it then became her personal residence in November of 1999. (R. 
58; T. 41,147.) Bowers was only able to move her mobile home onto the Property 
because Knighton had performed numerous improvements to the Property, 
including obtaining a building permit, pouring a concrete slab for off-street parking 
of two vehicles, installing sewer, water and electrical hookups at the Property for a 
mobile home, installing steps for a mobile home on the Property, and installing 
fenceposts. (T. 74-79,103,106,108.) The Property became Bowers' residence 
after Bowers breached the Agreement with Knighton by deciding not to sell the 
Property to Knighton. Bowers benefitted from Knighton's improvements to the 
Property and should not benefit from the Property being her residence at the time 
of trial because that was only possible due to her breach of the Agreement. 
B. Knighton did not Have "Unclean Hands" as Defined in Utah Law. 
Knighton did not have "unclean hands" as defined by Utah case law. A party 
seeking specific performance must do so with clean hands. DeLorean at 963. The 
Utah Supreme Court has defined someone without clean hands as someone "who 
is unable or unwilling to perform." Jd A party seeking specific performance "must 
have clean hands in having done equity himself... [t]hat is, he must take care to 
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discharge his own duties under the contract; and he cannot rely on any mere 
inconvenience as an excuse for his failure to do so." Fischer v. Johnson. 525 P.2d 
45,46 (Utah 1974) (where plaintiff failed to tender $3,000 payment prerequisite to 
entering into the contract of sale, denial of specific performance was upheld on 
appeal). This Court has held that a buyer failing to obtain a loan required by the 
Agreement, failing to communicate with seller during the course of the construction 
of a home on the subject property, and failure to visit and inspect progress of 
construction were indicative that the plaintiff buyer did not have clean hands and 
specific performance was correctly denied him. Carry. Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 
1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has further ruled that "[although the clean hands 
doctrine states a fundamental principle of equity juris prudence, this principle is not, 
in its application, so much an absolute rule to be followed by the courts as it is a 
guide for determining whether in a suit between two or more wrongdoers relief 
should be granted." Park v. Jamison. 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1961). 
In so ruling, the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated that there are many 
"qualifications and exceptions" to the clean hands doctrine, including "granting relief 
to an alleged wrongdoer having considered the fact that no injuries resulted from 
his acts or omissions." idL 
In the case at hand, the trial court held that Knighton had effectively tendered 
performance under the Agreement. (R. 222-29; T. 176.) In December of 1996, 
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Knighton became concerned that Bowers would ever perform under the Agreement 
and deliver good title to the Property. (T. 176.) Knighton therefore began paying 
the $200 monthly payments into an escrow account. (T. 176.) The trial court 
approved of Knighton's actions, stating from the bench that "it was reasonable for 
Mr. Knighton to do that... [h]e was entitled to protect - protect the money that he 
was paying." (T. 176.) The court further ruled that "because Ms. Bowers in this 
matter could not deliver clear title, there was never any need on the part of Mr. 
Knighton to pay the down payment, never any need to have any final closing 
papers." (T. 178.) 
The trial court went on to rule that because Knighton sufficiently aware that 
Bowers may never close the sale of the Property to Knighton in December of 1996, 
he was not entitled to specific performance. The trial court stated in its ruling: 
At that point in time, he easily could have declared breach and 
demanded his money back and gone on with life. But he chose not to 
do that for reasons I've already talked about. And that's fine. But to 
get equity, you've got to do equity and I can't say here that the plaintiff 
comes to this - comes to this court seeking equity with clean hands. 
And that, of course, is required before I can grant equity. 
(T. 180.) 
Such ruling by the court is a misinterpretation of the clean hands doctrine set 
forth in Utah law. The trial court specifically held that Knighton performed under the 
Agreement and need not have prepared final closing papers due to Bowers' refusal 
to close. (T.176-78.) Failing to demand monetary damages earlier in time rather 
than pursuing specific performance of a real property purchase agreement does not 
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equate to having "unclean hands." The trial court holding punishes Knighton for 
failing to rush to the remedy of the court system rather than trying to resolve his 
dispute with Bowers through other means prior to commencement of litigation. After 
December of 1996, not only did Knighton continue to make payments of $200 into 
an escrow account, he engaged in significant communications with Bowers and her 
attorney, and attempted to close the Property on numerous occasions. (R. 25-26, 
119-20; T. 72-74, 83; Trial Ex. Nos. 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26.) In fact, on 
December 21,1997, a full year after the date the trial court ruled Knighton should 
have declared breach, Bowers, through her counsel, indicated that she was still 
willing to sell the Property to Knighton. (Trial Ex. No. 19; See Addendum "C" 
attached hereto.) In addition, in December of 1996, Knighton had made significant 
improvements to the Property and his mobile home was located on the Property. 
(T. 74-79,103,106,108,120.) There is no "wrongdoing" or failure to perform on 
Knighton's part in this matter, but rather an ongoing interest in the Property and 
attempts to force the closing of the purchase. 
Knighton did everything within his power to complete the purchase of the real 
property and further testified at trial that he was willing to accept the Property with 
any defects in title that still might exist, although the record is clear that of the three 
exceptions he complained of, all three were cured. (T.88-89.) The trial court's 
ruling that the Property is not unique because it is merely a mobile home lot, it is 
Bower's residence, and Knighton did not seek to enforce his rights to specific 
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performance under the Agreement earlier in time is a misapplication of the law of 
the State of Utah as to be an abuse of discretion and should be overturned by this 
Court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BOWERS DID NOT 
HAVE CLEAR TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
The trial court erred in holding that Bowers did not have clear title to the 
Property at the time of trial because all defects to the title of the Property objected 
to by Knighton were satisfied prior to trial and there was no evidence at trial by 
either party that any other defects to the title of the Property existed. A trial court's 
finding of facts are clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 
1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998). 
In order to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of 
the evidence, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In 
marshaling the evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon 
v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). After constructing this array of 
competent evidence, the challenging party "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence . . . sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting 
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Following is the marshaled evidence regarding title to the Property. Only the 
parties testified in this matter. Bowers testified at the time the Agreement was 
entered into, she was attempting to obtain clear title from the previous owners, 
though she had already received a deed to the Property. (R. 56-57; T. 11.) The 
warranty deed received by Bowers noted that there was an outstanding trust deed 
and note on the Property, though Bowers did not realize it at the time she received 
the warranty deed. (T. 12; Trial Ex. No. 8.) On March 21,1996, the previous owner 
issued a quit claim deed to Bowers clearing the title problem. (T. 22-26; Trial Ex. 
No. 28.) Bowers further testified that a trust deed in favor of Paul Frampton, a trust 
deed in favor of AMTRA, Inc., and a Salt Lake County Certificate of Non-
Compliance recorded on the Property were the three defects in title that concerned 
Knighton. (T. 26-27; Trial Ex. Nos. 5-7.) Bowers testified that she paid Frampton 
$4,899.50 to obtain a release of the two trust deeds to prevent the Property from 
being sold at a trustee's sale scheduled for February of 1998. (R. 60; T. 30-31; 
Trial Ex. Nos. 15-18.) Bowers also testified that she paid Salt Lake County 
regarding the Salt Lake County Certificate of Non-Compliance for cleanup of the 
Property. (R. 60; T. 34-35.) Bowers also repeatedly testified that she did not 
understand there were encumbrances on the title to the Property at the time she 
purchased it, nor did she understand at any given time whether or not she had clear 
title to the Property, even at trial. (T. 11-13,18-19, 26-27, 44, 47, 53-54, 58-59.) 
E:\Laurie\Knighton\AppellateBrief.wpd -19-
Knighton testified that after entering into the Agreement with Bowers, he 
researched the title of the Property. (T. 66.) He learned that there were three 
defects to the title of the Property: the Frampton Trust Deed, the AMTRA Trust 
Deed, and the Salt Lake County Certificate of Non-Compliance, noted as Exhibit 
Nos. 5, 6, and 7 at trial. (T. 67; Trial Ex. Nos. 5-7.) Knighton testified during trial 
that he was still willing to purchase the Property under the terms of the Agreement, 
even if there might be any other undisclosed defects in the title to the Property. (T. 
88-89.) 
Relying on this evidence and no other, the court held that because Bowers 
does not have clear title, the trial court did "not believe that Ms. Bowers can perform 
today." (T. 178.) The court further held in denying Knighton specific performance 
that it would "not require the defendant to deliver title to the plaintiff, even if she 
could, which I don't think she can." (T. 181.) These factual holdings by the court 
are not supported by any evidence as noted above. Even though Bowers did not 
have a very clear understanding as to defects in the title of the Property at any 
given time during the length of the dispute or at trial, she presented no evidence of 
additional defects in the title to the Property other than the three items discovered 
by Knighton during his due diligence review of the title of the Property (the 
Frampton Trust Deed, the AMTRA Trust Deed, and the Salt Lake County Certificate 
of Non-Compliance) which were all satisfied by Bowers prior to trial, as established 
by her own testimony. (R. 60; T. 30-31, 34-35.) It is undisputed that she cured 
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these defects in title, and there was no evidence of any other defects presented at 
trial. The trial court's finding that Bowers did not have clear title at the time of trial 
is against the clear weight of the evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. This 
Court should overturn the trial court's holding and grant Knighton specific 
performance. Even if there are still defects in the title to the Property, pursuant to 
Kelley. Knighton is still entitled to specific performance of the Agreement. Because 
no evidence was presented regarding any lingering defects in title to the Property, 
there would be no abatement in the purchase price pursuant to Kelley. Kelley at fl 
1242. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING LOST-RENT DAMAGES 
TO KNIGHTON. 
The trial court erred in denying Knighton lost-rent damages in this matter. 
The trial court ruled from the bench in response to counsel for Knighton's request 
that the trial speak to the issue of lost-rent damages as follows: 
I intentionally have not. I just can't find anything here that would 
suggest that there's any lost rents or damages in that regard on the 
part of either party. Again, I'm satisfied that any lost rents occurred 
after, I think, a breach had been declared in December of 1996. So 
there is no - neither party's claimed for loss of rents and I just can't 
find any basis for damages either way there. Any set offs or additions. 
(T. 184-85.) 
A trial court's decision to award damages is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 31, U 6,973 P.2d 445. 
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A. In Addition to Specific Performance, Knighton is Entitled to Lost-Rent 
Damages. 
In addition to specific performance, Knighton is entitled to lost-rent damages 
in this matter. When specific performance is in order, "the buyer may be entitled 
to an award of lost rents or profits, while the seller may be entitled to interest on the 
purchase money withheld by the purchaser." Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 431 
(Utah 1980) (citations omitted). A seller is only entitled to "actual interest earned 
on the purchase money retained by the purchaser, if any." \± (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, Knighton testified that he had successfully leased the 
Property to a third party for $200 per month, commencing April of 1996. (T. 119-
20.) He was thwarted in his efforts to complete the rental of the Property due to 
Bowers' breach of the Agreement. (T. 178-79.) In addition, Bowers testified that 
she had been paying $360 per month for lot rental elsewhere when she moved her 
mobile home on to the Property. (T. 41.) Knighton placed the payments he 
withheld form Bowers in a non-interest bearing escrow account. (Trial Ex. No. 27.) 
Knighton is entitled to specific performance of the Agreement and lost-rent 
damages pursuant to Eliason. Furthermore, Bowers is not entitled to interest on the 
installment payments placed by Knighton into the escrow account because it was 
a non-interest bearing account so there is no "actual interest" as required for an 
award of such interest pursuant to Eliason. (Trial Ex. No. 27.) ig\ at 431. This 
matter should be remanded to the trial court to grant Knighton specific performance 
-22-
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and augment the amount of judgment in the amount of lost rents accruing from 
January 1997, when the Property was improved sufficiently to allow a mobile home 
to be installed pursuant to the West Valley City inspection, until the date of trial in 
the amount of $200 per month. (Trial Ex. No. 36.) 
B. Alternatively, Knighton's Damages Should be Increased by his Lost-
Rent Damages. 
Should this Court deny Knighton specific performance of the Agreement, 
Knighton should still be awarded lost-rent damages in this matter. In awarding 
damages for breach of contract, courts attempt to place the nonbreaching party in 
as good a position as if the contract had been performed. Saunders v. Sharp. 840 
P.2d 796, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
In the case at hand, Knighton testified that he had successfully leased the 
Property to a third party for $200 per month. (T. 119-20.) He was thwarted in his 
efforts to complete the rental of the Property due to Bowers' breach of the 
Agreement when he had improved the Property sufficiently to install a mobile home 
in January 1997. (T. 178-79; Trial Ex. No. 36.) In addition, Bowers testified that 
she had been paying $360 per month for lot rental elsewhere when she moved her 
mobile on to the Property. (T. 41.) Should this Court concur with the trial court that 
Knighton is entitled to damages rather than specific performance, he is entitled to 
damages that would put him in the same position had Bowers not breached the 
Agreement. i d Knighton should therefore also be awarded lost-rent damages in 
the amount of $200 per month from January 1997, when the Property was improved 
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sufficiently to allow a mobile home to be installed pursuant to the West Valley City 
inspection, to the date of trial. (R. 58; T. 41, 147; Trial Ex. No. 36.) Should this 
Court deny Knighton specific performance, this matter should be remanded to the 
trial court to augment the amount of judgment in the amount of lost rents accruing 
from January 1997, when the Property was improved sufficiently to allow a mobile 
home to be installed, until the date of trial in the amount of $200 per month. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for 
award of specific performance of the Agreement, transferring title of the Property 
to Knighton, award of lost rents accruing from January 1997 to the date of trial, and 
an award of Appellant's costs in successfully prevailing against Appellee, both at 
trial and on appeal. In the alternative, this Court should remand this matter to the 
trial court to augment the amount of judgment in the amount of lost rents caused 
Knighton accruing from January 1997 to the date of trial and an award of 
Appellant's costs in successfully prevailing against Appellee, both at trial and on 
appeal. 
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DATED this IX day of July, 2003 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
JOHN L. ADAMS 
POOLE & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)263-3344 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
CIVIL NO. 000909408 
VICKEY A. BOWERS, 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 4th day of December, 2002. The Court, 
having received evidence and argument of the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties entered into an agreement on December 22,1995, whereby the 
defendant agreed to sell and the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property subject to 
certain conditions, including Plaintiff's due diligence (Exhibit 2). 
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2. The terms of the agreement included a price for the property of $15,000, with 
a down payment and deferred payments payable to the Defendant Seller. 
3. The parties agreed that the Plaintiff would pay the Defendant $200.00 per 
month which would be applied to the price of the property and would be forfeited only if 
later the Plaintiff decided not to buy the property. 
4. In signing the December 22, 1996 agreement, the Defendant represented 
that she had clear title to the property. 
5. The Defendant did not, in fact, have clear title to the property but she should 
have known that she did not have clear title before entering in to the agreement with the 
Plaintiff, based upon the deed that she received on the property. 
6. The parties entered into a subsequent agreement on April 19, 1996, which 
was entered into after the Plaintiff discovered problems with Defendant's title and after 
he informed Defendant of those problems, specifically the existence of two trust deeds 
(Exhibits 5 and 6) and one Certificate of Non-Compliance (Exhibit 7). 
7. The April 19, 1996 agreement was executed as an extension of the 
December 22, 1995 agreement, adding that closing would be within thirty (30) days of 
Defendant clearing title, in anticipation that the liens would be removed within a short time. 
This agreement also permitted Plaintiff to move his mobile home to the property. 
8. The liens were not timely removed by Defendant as anticipated in April 1996. 
9. By December 1996, the Plaintiff was rightfully concerned about the money 
he had been paying to Defendant with the risk of never getting the property. 
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10. In December 1996, the Plaintiff stopped paying the Defendant directly and 
unilaterally started putting the $200 monthly payment in escrow. The Defendant did not 
object to this procedure. 
11. It was reasonable for Plaintiff to protect himself from Defendant's breach by 
placing the money in escrow until such time as clear title could be provided. 
12. Following December 1996, the property was scheduled for a trustee's sale 
by the trust deed holder of the property. The Defendant paid $4,899.50 on February 11, 
1998, to save the property from the trustee's sale and to obtain a release of the two trust 
deeds. 
13. After paying the money to obtain the release of the trust deeds, the 
Defendant decided she had too much time and money invested into the property to sell it 
to the Plaintiff for the agreed-to sales price of $15,000.00. 
14. The Defendant also paid off the lien in favor of Salt Lake County for the 
Certificate of Non-Compliance. 
15. Defendant had her attorneys write letter to the Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff 
had not performed on the contract, which statements were not true. 
16. Defendant did not advise Plaintiff of the release of the trust deeds or the 
payment of the liens in favor of Salt Lake County. 
17. The Plaintiff never prepared closing papers or tendered the payments directly 
to Defendant because the Defendant was not prepared to close. 
18. The Plaintiff recorded a Notice of Interest on the property on July 3, 1996. 
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19. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff could not perform under the contract 
if Defendant had performed by clearing the title. 
20. It is a non-special mobile home lot that is currently the Defendant's residence. 
21. Plaintiff knew in December 1996 that he could not likely get the property and 
could have then declared a breach and sued for return on his money. 
22. Plaintiff paid the Defendant $200.00 per month for a total of thirteen (13) 
months, which payments were to be applied against the purchase price. 
23. The Plaintiff continued to make deposits into escrow, such payments totaling 
$12,400.00. 
24. The Plaintiff made improvements to the property when he moved his trailer 
upon the property, which generally benefit the property as outlined in Exhibit 12, with the 
exception of the $683.00 fence and the $500.00 deduction that the Plaintiff made on that 
Exhibit, resulting in improvements to the property valued at $3,691.60. 
25. Plaintiff's last improvements were made on April 3, 1997. 
26. Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding loss of the benefit of his bargain. 
27. No other evidence was presented regarding the status of title to the property, 
although Plaintiff indicated he would take the property in its current status 
Based upon; the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The December 22, 1995 agreement, as extended by the April 19, 1996 
agreement, is legally binding between the parties. 
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2. Prior to trial, Defendant resolved the title issues objected to by Plaintiff, but 
the Defendant still may not have clear title to the property. 
3. The Plaintiff is entitled to recover for the Defendant's failure to obtain clear 
title. 
4. The Plaintiff, in hr pleadings, has asked for alternative remedies: (a) 
damages; and (b) specific performance. 
5. Where there is an adequate remedy11 at law, the Court should not resort to 
equity. 
6. Specific performance is not required or preferred over monetary damages if 
monetary damages are sufficient. 
7. There is nothing unique to the Plaintiff about the property at issue. 
8. Throi igl i» i 101 letai \ damages, there is an adequate remedy at law and specific 
performance is not an appropriate remedy and should not be granted. 
9. The Court finds1 - titt is entitled to njtjrinif-ni of $200.00 per month 
for the thirteen (13) months of payments that he paid to the Defendant, even though the 
first four (4) months, or $800 nil, wei e In hrli1 Ihn pmpeily (I at I1 y w<jm still part n1 the 
purchase price. 
10. The Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate on each 
of these $200.00 payments until the judgment is entered, then post-judgment statutory 
interest should accrue thereon. 
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11. The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $3,691.60 for the value of the 
improvements made by the Plaintiff to the property, with prejudgnlent interest to accrue 
thereon at the statutory rate from April 3, 1997, until the judgment is entered, then post-
judgment statutory interest should accrue thereon. 
12. The Plaintiff is entitled to the return of monies deposited into escrow. 
13. The Plaintiff is entitled to Rule 54(d) costs of the filing fee and service of the 
Complaint, which (--tMi! be added to lhtj |udcjn)«?nl 
14. Upon the judgment being paid by the Defendant, the Defendant is entitled 
to the removal of Plaintiff's Notice of Interest which he has recorded agaii ist the pi opei ty. 
15. Neither party is entitled to an award of lost rents or damages which occurred 
after the breach was declared in December 1996, except as specifically set forth above. 
16. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amounts set forth in Schedule "A" 
attached hereto. 
'- FDthis jU dayof JaniMiy, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
f'Mr+s^L^^ / * Y • r * v ^ 
_ 7 t^crv 
Jfl<rrrf(0-7V T . % v Uru en*-
fry-hrt~, 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the almvo ami toreqoinu. FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW in Case No. 000909408 was mailed, postage 
prepaid, United States Mail, the h day of January, 2003, to the following: 
Stephen J. Buhler, Esq. 
3540 South 400 West, Suite 245 
West Valley City. Utah 84120 
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KNIGHTON INTEREST CALCULATION 
Payment Amount Int. Rate Days Elapsed Interest Amt. 
22-Dec-95 
20-Jan-96 
19-Feb-96 
19-Mar-96 
19-Apr-96 
20-May-96 
21-Jun-96 
10-Jul-96 
06-Aug-96 
06-Sep-96 
20-Oct-96 
20-Nov-96 
21-Dec-96 
03-Apr-97 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$3,691.60 
to 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
Januaryl 0,2003 
2586.00 
2547.00 
2517.00 
2488.00 
2457.00 
2426.00 
2395.00 
2375.00 
2348.00 
2317.00 
2273.00 
2242.00 
2211.00 
2108.00 
$141.70 
$139.56 
$137.92 
$136.33 
$134.63 
$132.93 
$131.23 
$130.14 
$128.66 
$126.96 
$124.55 
$122.85 
$121.15 
$2,132.03 
Column Totals $6,291.60 $3,840.63 
Total Amount Due $10,132.23 
sr.HFnui r "A" 
TabB 
663 P.2d 502 
(Cite as: 34 Wash.App. 684, 663 P.2d 502) 
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C 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 2. 
Leslie D. DEAN and Jose M. Dean, husband and 
wife, Appellants, 
v. 
Burton M. GREGG, Respondent. 
No. 5273-3-II. 
May 18, 1983. 
Purchasers of realty under a real estate purchase 
and sale agreement appealed judgment entered by 
the Superior Court, Clark County, John Skimas, J., 
awarding the monetary damages for seller's breach 
of contract but denying them specific performance 
of that contract. The Court of Appeals, Petrie, J., 
held that purchasers of realty were entitled to 
specific performance. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Specific Performance €==>65 
358k65 Most Cited Cases 
Purchasers of realty were entitled to specific 
performance of real estate purchase and sale 
agreement, in that seller's failure to complete sale 
was a most flagrant breach of contract, with his 
excuse for nonperformance being simply that he 
entered into a bad bargain. 
[2] Specific Performance €^ =>16 
358kl6 Most Cited Cases 
In absence of fraud, entering into a bad bargain is 
not a sufficient reason to deny specific performance. 
*685 **502 Hugh Knapp, Camas, for the Deans. 
**503 Hugh Potter, Vancouver, for Gregg. 
PETRIE, Judge. 
Plaintiffs, Leslie D. Dean and Jose M. Dean, 
purchasers of realty under a real estate purchase and 
sale agreement with defendant, Burton M. Gregg, 
seller, appeal a judgment awarding them monetary 
damages for seller's breach of the contract but 
denying them specific performance of that contract. 
We reverse and direct specific performance in the 
manner set forth herein. 
The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact 
adequately describe the nature of the controversy. 
In June 1979 the parties executed a contract for the 
purchase and sale of a portion of Lot 64 of a 
previously recorded plat. The land in question, 
identified by courses and distances from a fixed 
point, was designated as Lot 4 of a proposed short 
plat of said Lot 64 which Dr. Gregg had presented 
to appropriate county officials and for which he had 
received conditional, preliminary approval. The 
contract provided, "This sale subject to property 
being short platted into 4 parcels," and also 
provided, "If either party defaults (that is, fails to 
perform the acts required of him) in his contractual 
performance herein, the non-defaulting party may 
seek specific performance pursuant to the terms of 
this agreement, damages, or rescission." 
On the date set for closing, plaintiffs were ready, 
willing and able to pay the purchase price in cash, 
and they signed all documents requiring their 
signatures. Defendant performed most of the acts 
required of him preparatory to performing his 
obligations under the contract. However, his costs 
to complete the platting procedure increased beyond 
his expectations. In anticipation of those costs 
exceeding the amount to be realized on the sale of 
Lot 4 of the plat, he arranged for a line of credit of 
$25,000. [FN1] Nevertheless, those costs exceeded 
the net sale expectation by $33,175.86. 
FN1. He also testified that he had $4,000 
available to assist financing the short plat. 
*686 In his words, when "costs started mounting 
up, I was becoming more and more concerned about 
the advisability of cutting this property up for what 
seemed to be a minimal economic return." 
As a result, he asked his broker to contact the 
Deans to see if they would purchase Lot 3 of the 
same proposed short plat with a down payment of 
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$15,000. They refused, and Dr. Gregg testified, "I 
elected not to proceed." 
The trial court expressly found that "The short plat 
probably could have been completed in December 
1979," had Dr. Gregg acquired legal title from his 
vendors and release of a bank lien. Indeed, the 
record indicates that he had substantially complied 
with the conditions imposed by the preliminary 
approval so that, upon presentation of the 
appropriate documents signed by him as owner, 
final approval would have been a ministerial act. 
By the time trial was held, however, the 
preliminary approval had lapsed. The trial court, 
though finding the breach, nevertheless denied 
specific performance because of (1) Dr. Gregg's 
financial inability to complete the transaction 
(despite the finding that the fair market value of the 
remainder of the proposed plat was in excess of 
$135,000), and (2) the court's lack of authority to 
order final approval of the short plat. 
[1][2] This court finds Dr. Gregg's failure to 
complete this sale a most flagrant breach of 
contract. Indeed, we find defendant's excuse for 
nonperformance so woefully deficient that justice 
demands reversal in this case. By his own 
testimony Dr. Gregg simply concluded that he had 
entered into a bad bargain. In the absence of fraud 
(and none is charged in this case), that is not a 
sufficient reason to deny specific performance. 
The facts in the case at bench are sufficiently 
similar to those in Egbert v. Way, 15 Wash.App. 76, 
546 P.2d 1246 (1976), and Hudesman v. Foley, 4 
Wash.App. 230, 480 P.2d 534 (1971), to warrant 
reversal. 
**504 The only complication is the fact that at this 
late date Dr. Gregg will be required to refile his 
application for approval of the short plat. We 
direct that he do so, and *687 that he pursue it in 
good faith under the supervision of the Superior 
Court of Clark County. In the event the county, 
despite Dr. Gregg's good faith efforts, should for 
any reason fail to grant final approval of the short 
plat after a reasonable time, the court is directed to 
require Dr. Gregg to convey the property, together 
with the easement specified in the contract, by 
courses and distances set forth in the contract. 
[FN2] 
FN2. A short subdivision is not subject to 
the restraints imposed by RCW 58.17.200 
and .320. A short subdivision "shall 
comply with the provisions of any local 
regulation adopted pursuant to RCW 
58.17.060." RCW 58.17.030. We note 
that Section 17.03.020(H) of Clark County 
Land Division Ordinance presently in 
effect, which will govern Dr. Gregg's 
renewed effort to obtain short plat 
approval, specifically exempts "Divisions 
of land made by Court Order" provided 
that the division complies "with all the 
provisions of Title 18, Clark County Code." 
It is so ordered. 
WORSWICK, Acting C.J., and REED, J, concur. 
663 P.2d 502, 34 Wash.App. 684 
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MOAK LEGAL SERVICES 
N. Alan Moak, Attorney 
Post Office Box 1044 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
December 21, 1997 
1-801-221-9004 
Kerry L. Knighton 
5890 South Kingston Way 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Re: Sale Lot 9 Kopperview 
Dear Mr. Knighton: 
My client is prepared to pay for having the water placed on lot 10 so that Paul Frampton will release 
lot 9, and the sale to you can be concluded. 
Please have your attorney contact me immediately relative to concluding this matter. As you know, 
Metro title has scheduled a trustee sale for 12 February 1998. 
Sincerely yours, 
N. Alan Moak 
